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THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
III
(3) The Granting Clause, including the Determination of
Rights Created by an Oil and Gas Lease.
I
The lessor hereby grants to the lessee, his heirs and assigns, the
exclusive right to mine and produce from the following described
land petroleum and natural gas, with possession of so much of such
land as may be necessary for such purpose.
2
II
The lessor has granted, demised, leased and let, and by these
presents does grant, demise, lease and let unto the lessee * * * for
the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil, gas and
other minerals * * * all that certain tract of land.
3
III
Lessor hereby grants and conveys unto the lessee, his heirs or
assigns, all the oil and gas in and under the following described
premises, together with the exclusive right to enter thereon at all
times for the purpose of drilling or operating for oil, gas, or watera'
The granting clauses set forth above, with unimportant varia-
tions, typify the provisions of this character which will be found
in oil and gas leases. It will be noted that each of these clauses
covers both oil and gas, this being universally characteristic of the
present-day lease. In the early period, however, the leases did not
include a grant of the natural gas.35 At the outset we must impress
our minds with the difference in the technical language employed
in these several clauses. The first clause grants the right to operate
*Continued from May MicH. L. REv. x8 MIcH L. REv. 652.
zKelly v. Keys, 2r3 Pa. 295, 62 At. 9ii (xpo6).
1'Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 At. 207 (o9).
m Carr v. Huntington Light & Fuel Co., 33 Ind. App. 1, 70 N. E. 552 (1904).
3
3 Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 397, (x869); Hicks v. American Natural
Gas Co., 2o7 Pa. 570, 57 At]. 55 (1904); Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. St. 307 (88o);
Marshall v. Forest Oil Co., x98 Pa. 83, 47 AtI. 927 (9pox).
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for oil and gas, with possession of the leased premises for that
purpose. The second clause grants, demises, leases and lets the
land itself for the purpose of conducting these operations, while
the third clause grants the oil and gas as such, together with the
use of the land for the purpose of exploration. Ordinarily, the
several clauses are used interchangeably, but the decisions in some
of the jurisdictions evidence a preference fo- one form over the
others. Thus in Pennsylvania the leases embody clauses of either
the first or second type, while in Ohio, Indiana and Texas the lease
generally employed contains the clause granting the oil and gas with
the use of the land for operating purposes. 6
Inasmuch as some of the courts find a distinction in the legal
effect of these several provisions, it is appropriate here to enter
upon an inquiry of great moment. The question is this: What
right, title, interest or estate passes to or vests in the lessee by vir-
tue of an oil and gas lease? The decisions touching this matter
illustrate in a marked degree the utter confusion in the cases which
characterizes the subject generally. In this situation it becomes
necessary to examine the holdings of each jurisdiction separately.
Pennsylvania determines the question here involved by first impres-
sion, and accordingly the attitude of the coufts in the other juris-
dictions should be considered in the light of the Pennsylvania cases.
-The leading Pennsylvania case is Funk v. Haldeman.3 T. This
holding is cited repeatedly in the opinions of the courts of the other
jurisdictions, btit nowhere, excepting in California and Kentucky,
perhaps, is the exact limitation of the doctrine of Funk v. Haldeman
observed. The granting clause involved here was of the class first
described, that is, the lease granted the right to explore for oil. It
was said that the grant passed no estate or property either in the
soil or minerals; that it created an incorporeal right, a profit a
prendre, the court concluding with this language:
36 Ohio Oil Co. v. Kelly, 9 Ohio Circ. Ct. Rep. 5x1 (895); Ohio Oil Co. v. Lane,
59 Ohio St. 307, 52 N. E. 791 (i898); Langmede v. Weaver, 65 Ohio St. x, 6o N. E.
992 (1go0); Van Etten v. Kelly, 66 Ohio St. 6o5, 64 N. E. 56o (19o2); Brown v. Fowler,
65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N. E. 76 (1902); Logansport Gas Co v. Ross, 32 Ind. App. 639, 70 N.
E. 544 (1903); Carr v. Huntington Light & Fuel Co., 33 Ind. App. x, 7o N. E. 552 (1904);
Indiana Gas Co. v. Leer, 34 Ind. App. 6i, 72 N. E. 283 (1904); Ohio Oil Company v.
Detamore, r65 Ind. 243, 73 N. E. 906 (1905); Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell, x64 Ind.
526, 73 N. E. 1084 (19o5); National Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 95 Texas 586, 67 S.
W. 545 (19o2); O'Neil v. Sun Co., s8 Texas C. App. 167, 123 S. W. 172 (19o9); With-
erspoon v. Staley, x56 S. W. (Tex., 1913) 557; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 1o7 Tex. 226,
176 S. W. 717 (gxS); Pierce-Fordyce Oil Ass'n. v. Woodrum, x88 S. W. (Tex., 1916)
245; Munsey v. Marnett Oil Co., x99 S. W. (Tex., 19x7) 686; Key v. Big Sandy Oil
CO., 212 S. W. (Tex., 1919) 300.
n Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229. (1866).
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"But out of this results the difficulty of a strict classifica-
tion of a right to take it as an incorporeal hereditament. If
a mineral, it is part of the land, and a right to take land or
any part of land is not, strictly speaking, an incorporeal
hereditament. Nor is the right to fire bote, or plow bote,
or turves; and yet for the want of a better classification,
this is treated in law as an incorporeal interest. To the same
head is to be referred these oil rights."
Right here it must be closely noted that the court experienced
some difficulty and entertained some doubt in designating the inter-
est'of the lessee as an incorporeal hereditament. In a compara-
tively recent case3 8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observes
that the conclusion in Funk v. Haldeman was reluctantly reached,
supplementing that observation with the following:
"This case (Funk v. Haldernan) was decided in 1866, a
very few years after the great utility of natural oil and its
immense value as an article of commerce had been demon-
strated. Its extent under the earth, the means of discovery,
and methods of production were still but imperfectly known.
It may be doubted whether now, after forty years more of
knowledge, if the question were first before us, we would
hold that a grant of exclusive right to the oil under a definite
tract of land, coupled with the exclusive right to portions of
the surface for production and transportation, is an incor-
poreal hereditament. But in Funk v. Haldeman we did so
classify it, and have followed that decision in many cases
since. Having due regard, therefore, to the rule of stare
decisis, we must continue to so classify such contracts."
Where a lease containing a granting clause of the type appear-
ing in Funk v. Haldemtan is involved, the Pefinsylvania court has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine of that case.
9 Kelly v. Keys00
presents a clear illustration of the doctrine announced in Funk v.
Haldeman. In the Funk case the court observed that the test for
determining whether the grant passed a corporeal or an incorporeal
33Hicks v. American Natural Gas Co., .207 Pa. 570, 57 Adt. 55 (x9o4).
23French v. Brewer, 9 Fed. Cas., p. 774, (x86x); Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. x64,
(1867); Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 397, (1869); Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa.
St. 297, (x870); Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Pet. Co., 72 Pa. St. 173, (1872);
Thompson's Appeal, 3o Pa. St. 225, (1882); Hicks V. American Natural Gas Co., supra;
Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. 295, 62 At. 911 (z9o6). Contra: Barker v. Dale, 2 Fed. Cas.,
p. 81o, (3869).
' Kelly v. Keys, supra.
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interest was whether the instrument would sustain an action in
ejectment. In the Kelly case, Kelly, the plaintiff, held a lease of
the same type involved in the Funk case. Kelly had never been in
possession of the land. The lessor granted a second lease to Keys,
who went into possession and found oil. Kelly then brought eject-
ment. The court cited the Funk case and kindred holdings to the
effect that the lease created an incorporeal hereditament, and then
concluded:
"When it is detei-mined that the subject of such a grant
was an incorporeal hereditament and not an estate in the
land or oil, it logically and necessarily results that it would
not support an action in ejectment. It is therefore well set-
tled in this jurisdiction that a lease granting the mere right
to explore for oil and gas vests the lessee with a license or
incorporeal hereditament only, which will not support an
action of ejectment, at the suit of a lessor who has never
been in possession."
Even here, however, a lessee who has once entered and then
been ousted may maintain ejectment.4 . Moreover, where a lease
of this kind is involved, and where the lessee has taken possession
of the leased premises for purposes not contemplated in the lease,
or where the lessee is in possession under the lease and the lessor
claims that the lease has been forfeited, the lessor may maintain
ejectment.
42
Where, however, the granting clause is of the second class
described under this head, and grants, demises, leases and lets the
land for the purpose of exploration, it is well settled in Pennsyl-
vania that the lease passes a corporeal interest in the land which
will support an action in ejectment at the suit of a lessor who has
never been in possession.4 The leading case on this question is
Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Company,/ where all of the earlier deci-
sions of the Pennsylvania court are cited and distinguished. Here
"Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. x64, (867); Hicks v. American Natural Gas Co.,
ao7 Pa. 570, 57 Ati. 55 (1904); Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. St. 297 (1870).
4"Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 397, (1869); Hicks v. American Nat. Gas
CO., 207 Pa. 570, 57 AtI. 55 (1904); Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. St. 307 (x88o); Mar-
shall v. Forest Oil Co., 198 Pa. 83, 47 At. 927, (901).
3Chicago Oil Co. v. United States Pet. Co., 57 Pa. St. 83, (r868); Kitchen v.
Smith, ox Pa. St. 452, (x882); Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa. St. 57, (1884); Brown v.
Beecher, 120 Pa. 59o, is AtI. 6o8, (1888); Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa.
235, x8 At. 724, (1889); Lynch v. Burford, 201 Pa. 52, 5o AtI. 228, (igox); Barns-
dall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 At. 207, (19o9); McKean v. Wolcott, 254 Pa.
323, 98 At. 955, (rx16).
"Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Ad. 207 (1909).
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the granting clause was of the "demise, lease and let" type. The
lessee had never been in possession and the lands were occupied by
a third party who held adversely to both the lessor and the lessee.
The lessee brought an action in ejectment under his lease. The
court, in distinguishing this form of lease from that involved in
Kelly v. Keys, Funk v. Haldenuan, and kindred cases, held that it
passed a corporeal estate which would support ejectment. It was
contended also that, conceding the contract to be a lease and not a
license, the plaintiff could not maintain ejectment because he had
not entered into possession of the premises. On this point the
court held that the rule of the common law with respect to an ordi-
nary leasehold did not apply; that the lessee in a lease of the
description here involved, by reason of the peculiar nature of the
subject dealt with, could maintain ejectment, although he had never
been in possession of the land.
Up to this point the Pennsylvania cases are entirely consistent:
Interspersed here and there, however, we finddecisions Wvhich tend
to obscure the otherwise positive attitude eof this court. In Stough-
ton's Appeal,45 the lease involved vested only the right to bore for
oil. A minor owned an interest in the fee, and the question pre-
sented was whether or not a lease made by the guardian without
an order of the Orphan's Court was valid. The court, in defining
the nature of the lease, declared it atnounted to an absolute sale of
all the oil within the land, and whether it be called a deed or a lease,
it was in effect the grant of part of the corpus of the estate and not
of a mere incorporeal right; that accordingly an order of the
Orphan's Court was indispensable to the validity of the lease. In
McElwaine v. BrowM, 4 where the granting clause is not set forth,
and where the court apparently attached no importance to this cir-
cumstance, an oil lease was held to constitute a leasehold estate,
and subject to the mechanic's lien law of the state applicable to
ordinary leaseholds. In Venture Oil Company v. Frett,
47 where
a lease of the same kind as that presented in the Funk case was
involved, the novel doctrine was first announced that until oil or
gas was found in paying quantities the only right possessed by the
lessee was to explore, but upon the discovery of oil or gas in pay-
ing quantities the contract took effect as an oil lease. In brief, the
court observes a distinction with respect to the rights created by a
lease before discovery and afterward. Later this doctrine is
'SAppeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. St. 198, (1879).
'6McElwaine v. Brouns, 7 Sad. 2o, Il AtI. 453 (1887).
41 Venture Oil Co. V. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 AtI. 732 (893).
753-
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expanded by the declaration that upon discovery an estate in the
oil and gas is vested.' 8 Here again an element of confusion is
observable. iSome of the cases hold that the discovery of oil or
gas in paying quantities vests the lessee with a title in the min-
erals,49 while it is also held that the same circumstance vests the
lessee with a title in the land.50 This line of cases, beginning with
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, is of obvious importance because the
courts of the oil-producing states adopt quite generally the indefi-
nite holdings of these cases as determining the nature of an oil
lease, completely ignoring the better reasoning of the cases first
treated in this discussion. Then again, in controversies between
life tenants and remaindermen, and between co-tenants asserting
conflicting claims to royalties under oil leases, it is held that the
lease, in legal effect, is a sale of an interest in the lands: 1
While Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts and kindred cases were decided
without any direct reference to the rule laid down in Funk v. Halde-
man, or the other rule finally adjudicated in Barnsdall v. Bradford
Gas Company, it is possible to harmonize the doctrine of the Ven-
ture Oil Company case upon this theory. In the latter case and
others following it the lease involved granted the right of explora-
tion only, but entry upon the land or the finding of oil or gas, even
under Funk v. Haldenans and similar cases, would vest such an
estate as would support ejectment at the suit of the lessee in the
event of ouster. It is evident, moreover, that the holdings in
Stoughton's Appeal and in Blakeley v. Marshall were the necessary
result of the record in those cases. Confronted as we are by a
fairly uniform course of decision in Pennsylvania on the question
in general, these isolated declarations respecting the nature of an
oil lease should not weaken the otherwise well-settled principles of
that jurisdiction. Finally, then, we reach these conclusions con-
cerning the nature of the rights created by an oil and gas lease as
laid down by the Pennsylvania court:
(i) Where the lease grants the right and privilege of explo-
ration only, the lessee takes an incorporeal hereditament, which will
48Hooks v. Forst, 165 Pa. 238, 30 At]. 846 (1895); Chambers v. Smith, 183 Pa.
x22, 38 AtI. 522 (897); Ahrns v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., x88 Pa. 249, 41 Ati. 739,
(1898); Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 45 At. xig (1899); Wilson v. Philadel-
phia Co., 210 Pa. 484, 6o At. 149 (1904); Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 243 Pa. 128,
89 Atl. 823 (r9z4).
4 Hooks v. Forst, supra; Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., supra.
5"Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., supra.
"Blakeley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Adt. 564 (1896); Marshall v. Mellott, 179
Pa. 37r, 36 Atl. 2o (1897); Jennings v. Bloomnfield, 199 Pa. 638, 49 Atl. 135 (19o);
McIntosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, 82 AtI. 949 (1912).
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not sustain an action in ejectment by a lessee who has never been
in possession of the leased premises.
(2) Even under a lease of this description, where the lessee
enters and produces oil, he obtains a vested estate in the nature of
a leasehold for mining purposes, or, as otherwise expressed, a
vested estate in the oil and gas.
(3) Where the lease demises, leases and lets the land for the
purpose of mining for oil and gas, a corporeal estate in the land
itself passes of such. dignity as to support an aetion in ejectment at
the suit of the lessor, even where he has never taken possession of
the land.
The California court, 'without citing the Pennsylvania cases
drawing the same distinction, finds a difference in the legal effect
of a "grant, demise and let" lease and the other forms. In Brook-
shire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Oil Co.,5 2 where a lease granting the mere
right to explore was involved, the court followed Venture Oil Co.
v. Fretts and kindred cases, and announced this rule:
"The title is inchoate and for purposes of exploration
only until oil is found. If oil is found, then the right to pro-
duce becomes a vested right."
In Chandler v. Hart,5 3 where a "grant,, demise and let" lease was
presented, the court, without citing the Pennsylvania cases to the
same effect, distinguished the Brookshire and Payne cases, and
'held that a "grant, demise and let" lease vested the lessee with a
present interest and estate in the land for the term and purposes
specified. This is now the established rule in California."' In
Allen v. Guaranty Oil Company it is held that a "grant, demise and
let" lease implies a covenant for quiet possession.?5
Texas also finds a distinction in the legal effect of the several
granting clauses, but upon a theory entirely different from that
=Brookshre Oil Co. v. Castnalia Oil Co., 155 Cal. 211, xo3 Pac. 927 (1909). In
Payne v. Neuval, 155 Cal. 46, 99 Pac. 476 (19g), it is held that a lease granting the
minerals, with a right to produce, is not a grant of land nor a lease, but a grant of a
right in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament.
0 Chandler v. Hart, x6x Cal. 405, 19 Pac. 5x6 (191x).
5' Kline v. Guaranty Oil Co., z67 Cal. 476, 140 Pac. 1 (1914); Commins v. Guar-
anty Oil Co., 29 Cal. App. 139, X54 Pac. 88z (1936); Allen v. Guaranty Oil Co., 176 Cal.
421, x68 Pac. 884 (1917); Smith v. United Crude Oil Co., 179 Cal. 570, 178 Pac. 341,
(i939). In Gradosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 155 Cal. 340, 99 Pac. 483 (1909),
where the right to operate was granted, it was held that this did not pass such an in-
terest in the oil and gas as to subject the interest of the lessee to taxation as real
estate.
M Allen v. Guaranty Oil Co., supra.
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adopted in Pennsylvania and California. In examining the Texas
cases it is also important "to remember that the leases there dealt
with are of the second type, that is, the oil and gas as such are
granted, with the right of entry for exploration. When the ques-
tion first arose in that jurisdiction both the Civil Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of the State, upon a writ of error in the
same cause,58 held that the lease did not pass an interest in the
lands, although the oil and gas was conveyed by the granting clause.
The instrument there considered was denominated an option, but
the reading of the opinions clearly discloses that this holding was
largely influenced by the character of the drilling clause which gave
the lessee the option to drill or pay. The rule in the Teel case was
squarely followed in two later cases decided by the Court of Appeals
where the granting clause was of the same description as that set
forth in the Teel case.57 Writs of error were refused by the Supreme
Court in both of these cases, and under the practice of that state
this action practically amounted to an affirmance of these holdings
by the Supreme Court. We are now brought to Texas Co. v.
Daugherty,5. which in effect overruled the cases already examined.
The lease before the court here was identical in terms with the lease
involved in Witherspoon v. Staley.-9 It not only purported to grant
the oil and gas, with the privilege of exploration, but it contained
this interpretative clause:
"This grant is not intended as a mere franchise, but is
intended as a conveyance of the property above described
(the oil and gas) for the purposes herein mentioned, and it
is so understood by both parties."
The precise issue of law presented was whether a group of leases
of this type passed such an interest in lands as to subject the inter-
est to taxation as real property under the statutes of the state. The
court first distinguished the granting clause shown by the record
from the other two clauses. It was said that the clause there
involvea was not a mere demise of the premises for the purpose
of drilling, nor was it the grant of the right to prospect. It was
then declared that this particular granting clause vested the lessee
with such an interest in the lands covered by the lease as would sub-
5 National Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Ted, 95 Tex. 586, 67 S. W. 545, 68 S. W. 979
(1902).
07O'Neil v. Sun Co., 5S Tex. C. App. 167, 123 S. W. 172 (r9o9); Witherspoon v.
Staley, 156 S. W. (Tex., 19r3) 557.
sTexas Co. v. Daugherty, xo7 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (rz5).
1a Witherspoon v. Staley, z56 S. W. (Tex., 1913) 557.
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ject that interest to taxation as real property. In opposition to this
view it was strongly argued by the lessee that the court was bound
by the holding in the Teel case and by its refusal of writs of error
in O'Neil v. Sun Company and Witherspoon v. Staley. Thereupon
the court in its opinion sought to distinguish the cases. The rea-
sons for the distinction are by no means satisfying, and the impres-
sion is left that the Daugherty case simply overrules the former
holdings of that court on the questions there presented. In any
event, it is now the settled rule in Texas that a lease of the type
alluded to here vests the lessee with an interest in the lands cov-
ered by the leaseY° This court has never been called upon to deter-
mine the legal effect of the other two granting clauses. When that
court, however, in Texas Company v. Daugherty, predicated its
decision very largely on the distinction between the several classes
of grants, the inference follows that, should the question be pre-
sented, it might be held in that jurisdiction that neither of the other
'clauses would vest the lessee with an interest in the lands.
The granting clause in the leases generally used in Ohio is some-
what peculiar. It combines the elements of both the second and
third classes under the division suggested here. The typical clause
used in that jurisdiction is in this language:
"Have granted, demised and let all the petroleum and
gas in or under that certain tract of land, and also all the
said tract of land, for the purposes and with the exclusive
right of drilling and operating upon said premises for petro-
leum and gas."
In defining the nature of a lease of this type, the Ohio court says:
"This is more than a license. It is a lease of the land,
oil and gas for a limited time and purpose, with a right of
possession to the extent reasonably required for such pur-
pose.""'
This conclusion is reached on principle and without. citation of
authority, and is uniformly followed by that court.62 Such is the
'Pierce-Fordyce Oil Assn. v. Woodrum, 188 S. W. (Tex., x916) 245; MUnsey v.
Marnett Oil Co., 199 S. W. (Tex., 1917) 687; McEntire v. Thomason, 2xo S. W. (Tex.,
1919) 563; Key v. Big Sandy Oil & Development Co., 212 S. W. (Tex., 1919) 300.
61 Woodland Oil Co. v. Crawford, 55 Ohio St. x61, 44 N. E. io93 (x896).
c2Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N. E. 502 (1897); Brown v. Fowler,
6s Ohio St. 507, 63 N. E. 76 (19o2), Central Oil & Nat. Gas Co. v. Eckert, 70 Ohio St
127, 71 N. E. 28r (1904); Alleghewny Oil Co. v. Snyder, zo6 Fed. 764 (r9oo). But see:
Detlor T. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E. 69o (z898).
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rule also in this jurisdiction where the oil and gas as such are not
granted, but where the land is granted, demised and let for the
purpose of operating for oil and gas,3 it being here held that the
instrument is more than a mere license, and that it is the land which
is granted, demised and let for the limited purpose and period men-
tioned in the lease.
The Illinois holdings manifest the same lack of precision in the
statement of the rule which characterizes the decisions generally
on this point. It is held that a lease granting the oil and gas does
not vest the lessee with an estate in the oil and gas until it is actually
found. 4  In Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co.,"5 where the exact
character of the granting clause was not given, it is said that the
lessee merely acquires the right of exploration with the right to pro-
duce if oil is foufld. But in Bruner v. Hicks," where the lease was
'for a term of ten years and as long thereafter as oil or gas should
be found, it was held that the lease vested a freehold interest upon
the novel theory that the term created by the lease might last for an
indefinite period of time. This holding is consistently followed in
subsequent decisions.0 7 The Supreme Court of the United States,
'in Smith v. Guffey,0 8 after reviewing the Illinois cases, observes
that it is settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois
that an oil and gas lease passes to the lessee a present vested right,
that is, a freehold interest in the premises. It is also held in this
jurisdiction that an oil and gas lease is a conveyanice of such char-
acter that it passes an interest in a statutory homestead.69
In Kentucky, the exact type of the lease not appearing in the
record, it was held that the lease vested the lessee with a title to the
oil and gas in plase so that this interest was subject to taxation.70
An oil and gas lease is a contract for thetransfer and sale of an
interest in lands, and is required to be in writing under the statutes
**Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., supra.
"Poe v. Ullery, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (igo8); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Ship-
man, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (igo); Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 239 Ill. 326, 88
N. E. 292 (1909).
6' Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., supra.
06Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 8z N. E. 888 (19o7).
G Poe v. Ullery, 4upra; Bruner v. Hicks, supra; Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263
IIL 518, xo5 N. E. 308 (1924). Contra: State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 8o,
24 S. E. 688 (2896).
OSmith v. Guffey, 237 U S. 1o (z9g5).
mBruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 888 (1907); Poe v. Ullery, 233 IIl. 56,
84 N. E. 46 (z9o8).
7O Wolf County v. Beckett, 227 Ky. 252, 1o5 S. W. 447 (1907); Mt. Sterling Oil Co.
v. Ratliff, 127 Ky. 1, r04 S. W. 993 (1907); Raydure v. Board of Superzisors, 183 Ky.
84, 209 S. W. 19 (1919).
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of frauds.7 1 In Kennedy v. Hicks,72 where a "grant, demise and
let" lease was involved, the court, under the authority of flarnsdall
v. Bradford Gas Company, held that a corporeal estate passed. It
is here decided that the lease conveyed to the lessee the title to the
oil and gas. An especially illuminating case originating in Ken-
tucky is Lindley v. Raydure.73 The lease presented was character-
ized by a "grant, demise and let" clause, and was for a term of ten
years and as long thereafter as oil and gas should be found. The
court said:'
"That an estate in the surface of the land of some char-
acter vests in the lessee immediately upon the execution of
the instrument I do not understand to be questioned any-
where. Possibly there is some question as to the exact nature
of the estate which vests, but otherwise there is none. On
the face of things, it would seem that at least an estate in
possession vests, i. e., an estate for ten years, in which to
explore for oil and gas, but that no estate to produce the oil
and gas then vests. So far, the estate is an estate upon con-
dition precedent, the condition being the discovery of oil or
gas, and does not vest until the happening of such condition."
The court then quoted that portion of Oil Company v. Fretts
which finds frequent repetition in the decisions, and thereupon made
the following comment:
"Substantially similar statements will be found in other
cases involving oil and gas leases. It may create the impres-
sion that there is nothing vested until oil or gas is found.
Such, however, is not the case, and no such thought was
intended to be conveyed. What is inchoate until oil or gas
is found is the right to produce oil and gas, and the right to
the oil and gas itself, which remains inchoate until produced.
The right to explore, therefore, is not at any time inchoate.
It is vested and will be protected from the time of the exe-
cution of the instrument."
While the Louisiana court holds that an oil and gas lease does
not pass title to the oil and gas in place, but only the right to explore,
it is also held in that jurisdiction that a contract of this description
"nBeckeft-Isemran Oil Co. v. Backer, x65 Ky. 8x8, 178 S. W. 1084 (915).
UKennedy v. Hicks, i8o Ky. s62, 203 S. W. 318 (xgx8).
"Lindley v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (917). Affirmed: Raydure v. Lindley, 249
Fed. 675 (xg8).
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partakes of the nature of a sale as well as a lease.7 4 But in a late
case this court holds that oil and gas contracts should be treated as
leases under the laws of Louisiana.
75
The Oklahoma cases on this question reflect the difficulty which
the courts in the more recent oil-producing states always experience
in reaching a sound and exact conclusion upon many of the impor-
tant propositions peculiar to the subject. In establishing a precedent
on this point the Oklahoma court was confronted by the confused
and conflicting state of decision which is evidenced by our discus-
sion under this head. Moreover, the bench and bar of the State
were wholly untrained in the law of oil and gas. In this situation
it was inevitable that the early decisions of the Oklahoma court
would be founded on certain isolated cases rather than upon .a close
observance of the true distinction in all the cases bearing upon the
question. It was early decided that an oil and gas lease was- an
alienation of lands within the meaning of certain acts of Congress
which placed restrictions upon the sale of Indian lands.76  In
Kolachney v. Galbreath1,7 a "grant, demise and let" lease was
involved. The court held that the lease did not vest the lessee with
any title to the oil or gas nor in the land, but created an incorporeal
hereditament only. It was also decided that a grant of this nature
-would not sustain an action in ejectment by a lessee who had never
assumed possession of the leased premises. Among the cases cited
to support this holding were Kelly v. Keys, 8 P'ayne v. Neuval'9 and
Detlor v. Holland.80 It is true that the cases so cited supported this
principle, but not as applied to the character of lease presented in
this case. If the court has grasped the true posture of the cases in
Pennsylvania, California and Ohio, these particular decisions would
not have been cited to support the rule here declared. For a time
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma steadfastly adhered to the doc-
trine of Koiachney v. Galbreath.$' An oil and gas lease is a chattel'
7
4
Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913); Cooke v. Gulf Re.
fining Co., 135 La. 6og, 65 So. 758 (1914); Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 138 La. 555,
70 So. 509 (915).
USpence v. Lucas, r38 La. 763, 70 So. 796 (ig1s).
7Eldred v. Okmulgee Loan & Trust Co., 22 Okla. 742, 98 Pac. 929 (i9o8); Slharp
v. Lancaster, 23 Okla. 349, zoo Pac. 578 (igog); Barnes v. Stonebraker, 28 Okla. 75, 113
Pac. 903 (909); Hoyt v. Fizico, 175 Pac. (Okla., x918) 517; Parker v. Riley, 243 Fed.
42 (1917).
7rKolachney v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 110 PaC. 902 (1910).
78 Kelly v. Keys; 2z3 Pa. 295, 62 Atl. 9x1 (xgo6).
"Pavne v. Neuval. .55 Cal. 46. oo Pac. 476 (1oo').
80Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E. 69o (1898).
"'Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas Co., 29 Okla. 719, 119 Pac. 260 (1911); Duff Y.
Keaton, 33 Okla. 92, 124 Pac. 291 (1912); Deming Investment Co. v. Lanham, 36 Okla.
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real as distinguished from real property.82  In Kelly v. Harris -.
the lease granted and sold all of the oil and gas, with the right to
explore. This was held to constitute an incorporeal hereditament.
Controlled by these cases, and regardless of the fact that the leases
involved were of the "grant, demise and let" type, the Federal Court
for this jurisdiction sustained the rule."4 A "grant, demise and
let" lease was held to constitute a mere option terminable at the
election of the lessor upon any rental paying date. 5 Inasmuch as
the lease created an incorporeal hereditament. only, the grant was
not within the champerty laws of the state.86 The interest vested
by an oil lease is such that if granted in the homestead the wife
must join therein.87 At this stage a relaxation from the earlier rule
had its inception. It was then decided that while strictly speaking
an oil and gas mining lease does not convey an estate in the realty
prior to the development of the leased premises, it operates to pass
the immediate and exclusive right of possession of the land for the
purposes named in the lease.8 Then, under the authority of Lind-
ley v. Raydure,9 it was said:
"The lease herein involved was not wholly executory and
unperformed. So far as the lessors were concerned the lease
was wholly executed, and by its terms there was granted to
the lessee an estate in possession which vested immediately
on its execution and delivery, under which lessees had the
right, according to the terms of the lease, for a period of
five years, to make exploration on the leased premises." 90
The court having receded from the early cases to this extent, it
was but a step to the position that an oil and gas lease vested the
lessee with an interest in land. Therefore, where a "grant, demise
and let" lease was involved, and after a review of all of the Okla-
773, 130 Pac. 260 (1913); In re Indian Ty. Illuinnating Co., 43 Okla. 307, 142 Pac. 997
(1914); Tupeker v. Deaner, 46 Okla. 328, 148 Pac. 853 (1915); Mitchell v. Probst, sz
Okla. zo, 152 Pac. 597 (xgiS); Kelly v. Harris, x62 Pac. (Okla., 1916) -rg; Brennan v.
Hunter, 172 Pac. (Okla., x918) 49.
83 Tupeker v. Deaner, supra; Duff v. Keaton, supra.
uKelly v. Harris, supra.
"Barnsdall v. Owen, 200 Fed. 519 (xiga); Priddy v. Thompson, 204 Fed. 955
(19x3); Kemmerer v. Midland Oil Co., 229 Fed. 872 (x915); Etchen v. Cheney, 235 Fed.
1o4 (igx6).
"Brown v. Wilson, 58 Okla. 392, x6o Pac. 94 (1916).
"Etchen v. Cheney, supra.
trCarter Oil Co. v. Popp, 174 Pac. (Okla., 1918) 747.
mHoyt v. Fixico, 175 Pac. (Okla., 191S) 517. -
"Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (1917).
"Northwestern Oil Co. Y. Branine, 175 Pac. (Okla., 1918) 533.
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homa cases touching the question, this court fell into accord with
the majority rule, and held that the lease granted to the lessee a
present vested interest in the land.9 This is now the rule of the
Federal Court in this jurisdiction.92
The cases heretofore examined treat an oil and gas lease as vest-
ing the lessee with an interest in land upon one theory or another.
We are now brought to the consideration of those decisions which
either hold an oil and tas lease to create an incorporeal heredita-
ment only, or which follow the doctrine of Oil Company v. Fretts,
without due allowance for the true rule prevailing in Pennsylvania.
As already stated, the lease used in Indiana grants the oil and gas,
with the right of exploration. The doctrine is well established in
this jurisdiction that such leases do not vest the lessee with a title
to the oil and gas in place, but that title to the minerals vests only
upon production, and then to the extent of the oil appropriated.93
It was first held that an oil and gas lease constitutes a leasehold
interest.' Under this doctrine a lease was held to import a covenant
for quiet enjoyment.9 5  Under the authority of Funk v. Haldeman
it was then held that a lease was a grant of an incorporeal heredita-
ment.96 The later cases hold that these contracts are not leases
within the meaning of the law of landlord and tenant.9 7  A lease
granting the oil and gas, with an "unless" drilling clause, was held
to create an option in the lessee to explore, and not a leasehold.98
While these expressions are found in the Indiana cases, the exact
rule in this jurisdiction seems to be based on Oif Company v. Fretts,
the rule being that the lessee has no title to the minerals or to the
land. until the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities.99 The
9
t
Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okla., x98) 87.
9aShaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (97); Aggers v. Shaffer, 256 Fed. 648 (1919).
But see also: Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., 259 Fed. 656 (I919), where a "grant,
demise and let" lease with an "unless" drilling clause is held to create an option vest-
ing no rights in rem; Washburn v. Gillespie, 26z Fed. 41 (1919).
9 New American Oil & Mining Co. v. Troyer, x66 Ind. 402, 77 N. E. 739 (i9o6);
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (igoo); Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63
N. E. 490 (ipo2); Kahle v. Crown Oil Co., x8o Ind. i3z, oo N. E. 68r (rg3); Rupel
v. Ohio Oil Co,, 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225 (1911).
14 Chandler v. Pittsburgh Glass Co., 2o Ind. App. z65, 5o N. E. 400 (89); Shenk
v. Stahl, 35 mId. App. 493, 74 N. E. 538 (r905).
9 Shenk v. Stahl, supra.
"eHeller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490 (1902); Monaghan v. Mount,
36 Ind. App. z88, 74 N. E. 579 (1905); Campbell v. Smith, z8o Ind. z59, xoi N. E. 89
(1913).
9 New American Oil & Mining Co. v. Troyer, supra; Dill v. Froze, 169 Ind. 53, 79
N. E. 971 (1907); Stahl v. Illinois Oil Co., 45 Ind. App. 211, 90 N. E. 632 (igio).
13Risch v. Burch, 175 Ind. 62r, 95 N. E. 123 (191).
9
9
Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Curless, 2z Ind. App. 346, 52 N. E. 782 (r899); Gad-
bury v. Ohio Nat. Gas Co., 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259 (1903); Carr v. Huntington Light &
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title vested by production is an interest in the land for the purpose
of production.100
While the recent West Virginia cases relating to oil and gas law
evidence a clear understanding of the subject upon questions in
general, there is a decided lack of certainty and precision in the hold-
ings of this court on the proposition now being considered. The
first important announcement on this point is in State v. South Penn
Oil Company."' A "grant, demise and let" lease was involved. The
court, under the primary authority of Oil Company v. Fretts, held
that before the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities the lessee
took no estate either in the land or minerals, but that upon finding
oil or gas the contract took effect as a lease. In further support of
this holding the court cited the two different lines of authority in
Pennsylvania, that is, Funk v. Haldeman and kindred cases holding
that an incorporeal right attached under the type of lease there in-
volved, and Brown v. Beecher and Duke v. Hague, which were to
the effect that a "grant, demise and let" lease vested the lessee with
a corporeal estate which would support an action in ejectment. The
court utterly failed to recognize the distinction between the two lines
of authority. The rule is settled in West Virginia, however, that
an oil and gas lease of whatever character does not vest the lessee
with a title'to the land or minerals until discovery. 0 2  As to the
character of title vested by discovery the decisions are not in agree-
ment. It is held that the finding of oil or gas vests the lessee with
the right to produce the oil and gas.0 3  It is*also held that upon
this occurrence the lessee acquires a vested title to the oil and gas
in place.' In Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan the lease granted all of
the oil and gas, with the right to explore. In commenting on the
character of the instrument it was stated that a: grant of this type
was construed as a lease by the Ohio court, but that in West Vir-
Fuel Co., 33 Ind. App. x, 7o N. E. 552 (1904); Ramage v. Wilson, 45 Ind. App. 599,
88 N. E. 862 (9o9); Johnson v. Sidey, 59 Ind. App. 678, 1o9 N. E. 934 (1915); Rem-
barger v. Losch, 118 N. E. 831 (igiS).
10
oRembarger v. Losch, supra; Carr v. Huntington Light & Fuel Co., supra; Ramage
Y. Wilson, supra. I
'01State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. go, 24 S. E. 688 (x896).
" Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220 (x897); Steelsmith v. Gartlan,
45 W,. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898); Carter v. Tyler County Court, 45 W. Va. 8o6, 32
S. E. 26 (x899); Ammons v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 61o, 35 S. E. 1004 (19oo);
Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902); Core
v. New York Petroleum Co., 52 W. Va. 276, 43 S. E. 128 (19o3); Toothman v. Court-
ney, 62 V. Va. x67, 58 S. E. 9x5 (1907); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 6s W. Va. 531,
64 S. E. 836 (1909); Harris v. Michael, 70 W. Va. 356, 73 S. E. 934 (1912).
10 Crawford v. Ritchey, suPra; Harris v. Michael, supra.
104 Core v. New York Petroleum Co., supra; State v. South Penn Oil Co., supra.
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ginia and Pennsylvania it was treated as a mere license, vesting no
estate. A "grant, demise and let" lease creates an incorporeal here-
ditament,' 5 but carries with it an implied covenant for quiet pos-
session for the purposes of the lease.1 6 Where a lease granted all
of the oil and gas, with the right of exploration, it was held that this
did not pass a title to the oil and gas in place,10 7 nor will such a lease
support an action in ejectment where the lessee had never taken pos-
session," 8 but an oil and gas lease is a leasehold under the mechanic's
lien law of the state. 0 9 Interspersed with these holdings and under
the authority of Stoughton's Appeal and Blakeley v. Marshall, de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, it is held that an oil
and gas lease in legal effect was a grant of a part of the corpus of
the estate, that is, the oil and gas." These cases, however, involve
leases covering the lands of minors or incompetents, or conflicting
claims to royalties under leases. It was probably necessary to attrib-
ute this effect to the leases under consideration as a predicate for the
decision of the particular issues there presented. Such is the view
of these cases in the dissenting opinion in Updegraff v. Blue Creek
Coal Company. The court was confronted by the apparent conflict
between the cases just alluded to and the other holdings in West
Virginia, in Campbell v. Lynch,"' where it is said: "Though there
are several judicial declarations that such a lease constitutes a virtual
sale of the oil and gas, there are, perhaps, just as many, or more, to
the effect that it does not pass any title, legal or equitable, to the oil
and gas in place. All agree that after discovery of the minerals it
vests a conditional estate in the lessee; but it is not title to the min-
erals in place. It is an incorporeal right to mine, the exercise of
which may exhaust the minerals. This right, of course, is beyond
the control of the lessor as long as the conditions upon which it
05Ford v. Ball, 76 W. Va. 663, 86 S. E. 562 (1915); Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W. Va.
374, 94 S. E. 739 (1917).
10OHeadley v. Hoopengarner, 6o W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744 (z9o6).
Iff Toothman v. Courtney, 6z W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915 (1907).
103 Carnegie Nat. Gas Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 56 W. Va. 402, 49 S. E. 548 (1904).
109 Showalter v. Lowndes, 56 W. Va. 462, 49 S. E. 448 (1904).
110 Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (897); South Penn Oil Co. v.
McIntyre, 44 W. Va. 296, 28 S. E. 922 (x898); Lawson v. Kirchner, So W. Va. 344,
40 S. E. 344 (19o); Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533 (1903); Jamison
Coal Co. v. Carnegie Nat. Gas Co., 77 W. Va. 30, 87 S. E. 451 (i91S); Updegraff v.
Blue Creek Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 36, 81 S. E. 1050 (1914).
"' Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W. Va. 374, 94 S. E. 739 (1917). See also: South Penn
Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 96r (19r3); Headley v. Hoopengarner, 6o
W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744 (19o6). In Harvey Coal Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 6o5, 53 S.
E. 928 (I9o). the court clearly states the limitation of the doctrine of Wilson v. Youst,
supra, and kindred cases.
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depends are complied with." This, no doubt, states the ultimate
rule ir West Virginia, which is to the effect that the lessee acquires
no interest or estate in the land or the oil or gas until discovery;
that thereupon he acquires a vested estate. This estate is thus de-
scribed in one of the most recent decisions by that court: "After
discovery of minerals he has a conditional estate for years, in the
nature of a tenancy of the surface. The relation of landlord and
tenant then attaches.""
The rule is well settled in Kansas that an oil and gas lease cre-
ates an incorporeal hereditament or license, this being true regardless
of the character of the lease presented. The lessee acquires no in-
terest or estate in either the land or the oil and gas.' 3  Where the
lease granted the oil and gas with the right to explore therefor, no
title to the oil or gas in place passed."' In opposition to the rule in
Pennsylvania and West Virginia it is here held that a lease for oil
and gas mining purposes does not constitute a leasehold within the
mechanic's lien statute."51 This doctrine applies although oil has
been discovered ;"" but an oil and gas lease or an assignment thereof
is a grant of such character that it is within the statute of frauds." 7
It also constitutes an alienation within the homestead statute.izs
Where a lease with an "unless" drilling clause was involved the
court described the instrument as an option." 9 It remains only to
examine certain isolated decisions on this question. Arkansas, Col-
orado, Alabama and Virginia follow the doctrine of Oil Company
u2 Carper v. United Fuel Co., 78 W. Va. 436. 89 S. E. Iz (z9x6). See also: South
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, supra.
12Dickey v. Coffeyville Brick Co., 69 Kan. io6, 76 Pac. 398 (1904); Rawlings v.
Armel, 70 Kan. 778, 79 Pac. 683 (x9o5); Kansas Nat. Gas Co. v. Board of ComM'rs., 75
Kan. 335, 89 Pac. 75o (1907); Eastern Ohio Oil Co. v. McEvoy, 75 Kan. 5x5, 89 Pac.
1048 (1907); Martin v. Crude Oil Co., 77 Kan. 85i, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907); Phillips v.
Springfield Crude Oil Co., 76 Kan. 783, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907); Beardsley v. Kansas Nat
Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96 Pac. 859 (1908); Robinson v. Smalley, 102 Kan. 842, 171 Pac.
1155 (1918); White v. Green, 1o3 Kan. 405, 173 Pac. 974 (i918); Huston v. Cox, o3
Kan. 73, 172 Pac. 992 (1918).
'14Finch v. Beyer, 94 Kan. 525, 146 Pac. 1141 (xgas); Hover v. McNeill, xo2 Kan.
492, 175 Pac. 150 (1918).
But see: Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 8or (x9o5), where it is held that
the lease was a grant in praesenti of all the oil and gas, with the right to explore there-
for, and if found, to appropriate them.
us Eastern Oil Co. v. McEvoy, supra; Phillips v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., supra;
Martin v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., supra.
310 Phillips v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., supra; Martin v. Springfield Crude Oil Co.,
supra.
117 White v. Green supra; Robinson v. Smalley, supra.
msPalmer v. Parish, 6z Kan. 311, 59 Pac. 640 (1900); Thompson v. Milliken, 93
Kan. 72, 143 Pac. 430 (1914).
" O'Neal Y. Risinger, 77 Kan. 63, 93 Pac. 340 (1908).
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v. Fretts. ' New York holds that a "grant, demise and let" lease
creates an incorporeal hereditament, citing Funk v. Haldeman and
other Pennsylvania cases to the same effect, the court failing to ob-
serve the distinction between the two forms of leases.' s Missouri
holds that a "grant, demise and let" lease with an "unless" drilling
clause creates an option. 2 Wyoming, without determining the
exact nature of the grant, held that an oil and gas lease was within
the statute of frauds,' -2 3 while the Supreme Court of Washington,
describing the lease as one creating an incorporeal hereditament,
held that an oil and gas lease is not within the statute of frauds.- 4
The exact nature of the rights created by an oil and gas lease
must be determined from a critical examination of the cases just
considered and upon principle. Before centering our attention upon
this inquiry, however, the vast importance of the proposition in its
relation to other questions arising in the law of oil and gas must be
definitely understood. Broadly speaking, the law of oil and gas
is characterized by four principles which are deeply embedded in
the decisions. First, the common law rule that a grant must be con-
strued most strictly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee
has given way to the rule that the express or implied obligations of
the lessee to develop the leased premises must be strictly construed
against the lessee and in favor of the lessor. Second, implied cove-
nants or conditions are read into these feases which bind the lessee
to a higher degree of diligence in the development and operation of
the property than is the case under a lease of solid minerals. Third,
equity favors rather than abhors the forfeiture of an oil and gas
lease upon default by the lessee. Fourth, the common law rule that
there can be no abndonment of a vested estate in less time than the
period prescribed by the statute of limitations has no application
in this jurisprudence. These doctrines in their tendency are de-
structive of the security and stability of the lessee's title, and had
their origin largely in the novel conception that until discovery the
lessee's title was inchoate only. Therefore, from a strictly prac-
tical standpoint the gist of our inquiry is this: Does the lessee ac-
quire a vested property right for the purposes of the lease immedi-
ately upon its execution and delivery, or is the title then taken by
10 Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Gas Co., io3 Ark. x75, 146 S. W. 122 (1912).;
Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Or,nan, i9 Colo. App. 79, 73 Pac. 628 (1903); Rechard
v. Cowley, So So. (Ala., x918) 419; Richlands Oil Co. v. Morriss, io8 Va. 288, 6i S. E.
762 (19o8).
1=1 Wagner v. Mallory, x69 N. Y. 5ox, 62 N. E. 584 (19oz).
122Morton v. Drosten, x85 S. W. (Mo., x96) 733.
='Montana Oil Co. v. Gibson, i9 Wyo. 1, 113 Pac. 784 (1911).
=4 Walla Walla Oil, etc. Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash. 359, 174 Pac. 980 (19i8).
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the lessee inchoate or executory merely until actual discovery of oil
or gas? The decisions are at variarce on this exact point, which
circumstance is largely due to the failure on the part of some of the
courts to recognize the elementary distinction between a property
right and a contractual right. This fundamental error is aptly illus-
trated by a single line of cases. Owing to the utter impossibility of
proving the damages sustained by a lessee where a lessor denies his
title the only adequate remedy available to the lessee is an action to
protect or enforce his right of property under his lease. Ordinarily
there are two conditions which bring a lessee into court to protect
or enforce his rights under this lease. First, where the lessor re-
sists the possession of the lessee either arbitrarily or upon the ground
of an alleged forfeiture, or where, for the same reasons, the lessor
has granted a second lease to a third party who has gone into pos-
session, commenced operations, and who resists the possession of
the first lessee. Obviously one of two remedies only are available,
first, ejectment at the suit-of the first lessee to recover possession
of the leased premises for the purpose of the lease, or secondly, an
action in equity for an injunction restraining the lessor from inter-
fering with the lessee's possession and operations, or in case a sec-
ond lessee is in 'possession, to restrain the operations of that lessee
and to further enjoin him from interfering with the possession and
work of development of the first lessee. In these circumstances if
the lease is of the "grant, demise or let" type, it is held in Pennsyl-
vania that the lessee may maintain ejectment. Such also appears
to be the tendency of the Kentucky courts at this time.
12 5 But in
every other jurisdiction the lessee must resort to a court of equity
to protect his property right under his lease. When the case as-
sumes this attitude some of the courts have fallen into a most serious
error. Starting with the conception that the lessee possesses a purely
inchoate right, it logically follows that the lessee is seeking the
negative specific enforcement of an executory contract. Thus view-
ed, the surrender clause of the lease or its equivalent the "unless"
clause, either one or the other of which is an inevitable incident
of an oil and gas lease, proves to be an insuperable bar to any relief
in equity because there is no mutuality of remedy between the
parties. That is, by reason of the lessee's option to surrender, the
lessor would not be entitled to a decree for specific enforcement
against the lessee, the lessee having the right to avoid the decree by
exercising his right of surrender. On this principle it was held in
several jurisdictions that the lessee was not entitled to relief in
'I Beatty Oil & Gas Co. v. Blanton, 245 Fed. 979 (1917).
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equity for the enforcement or protection of his rights under the
lease."" Inasmuch as it was held in the same jurisdictions that the
lessee could not maintain ejectment he was, for all practical pur-
poses, left remediless, the remedy at law for damages being wholly
inadequate. All these cases either directly or indirectly were founded
on Marble Company v. Ripley, '2 7 where the sole matter presentea
was the specific enforcement of an executory contract as distin-
guished from an action for the protection of a vested property right.
It required a specific decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States to arrest this destructive doctrine.128  In the Guffey case the
original lessee held title to an oil and gas lease containing a sur-
render clause. The lessor granted a second lease, the lessee there-
under going into possession and commencing operations. The first
lessee brought his action in equity to restrain the second lessee from
developing the property and from interfering with the possession
and development thereof by the first lessee. The defense urged was
that the surrender clause in plaintiff's lease evidenced a contract of
such character that it could not be specifically enforced against the
lessee by the lessor, and such was the decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit.129  The case, however, went to
the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of certiorari,
the cause being reversed on this point, the court saying: "It next
is insisted that according to the general principles and rules of equity
administered in the Federal courts the surrender clause constitutes
an insuperable obstacle to granting the relief sought, the argument
being that, as the complainants have a reserve option to surrender
the lease at any time, it cannot be specifically enforced against them,
and therefore cannot be similarly enforced in their favor. The rule
intended to be invoked has to do with the specific enforcement of
executory contracts, is restrained by many exceptions, and has been
the subject of divergent opinions on the part of jurists and text-
writers. Without considering it in other aspects we think it is with-
out present application. Rightly understood this is not a suit for
specific performnance. Its purpose is not to enforce an executory
contract to give a lease, or even to enforce an executory promise in
=Federal Oil Co. v. We4tern Oil Co., 112 Fed. 373 (z9o2); Federal Oil Co. v.
Western Oil Co., zsz Fed. 674 (1902); Smith v. Guffey, 2o2 Fed. xo6 (1912); Watford
Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (I9O8); Kolachney v. Galbreath, 26
Okla 772, io Pac. 902 (1910); Hill Oil & Gas Co. v. White, 157 Pac. (Okla., 1915) 710;
Warner v. Page, 59 Okla. 259, '59 Pac. 264 (xz6); Advance Oil Co. v. Hunt, x6 N. E.
(mnd.. 1917) 340.
'7Mlarble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U. S. 339 (1870).
I" Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 1OI.
'"Smith v. Guffey, 202 Fed. zo6.
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a lease already given, but to protect a present vested leasehold
amounting to a freehold interest from continuing and irreparable
injury calculated to accomplish its practical destruction. The com-
plaint is not that performance of some promised act is being withheld
or refused, but that complainant's vested freehold right is being
wrongfully violated and impaired in a way which calls for preven-
tive relief. In this respect the case is not materially different from
what it would be if the complainants were claiming under an abso-
lute conveyance rather than a lease." It is here apparent that the
Supreme Court of the United States clearly recognized that the sub-
ject-matter dealt with was a property right as distinguished from a
mere contractual right. The later decisions are in harmony with
the principle so announced.1 30 In the Shaffer case it is distinctly
held that the suit was for the protection of a property right and not
for the enforcement of any executory contractual provisions of the
lease. Notwithstanding this posture of the cases we find the Ap-
pellate Court of Indiana in a recent case following the earlier rule
on this question.'3 '
With the importance of the question thus emphasized it becomes
necessary for us to determine, both upon principle and authority,
whether or not the lessee's initial right to explore constitutes a vested
property right, or whether the right of the lessee before discovery
is inchoate only. If the former concept can be upheld we are not
so greatly concerned with the technical character of the lessee's
interest or estate before discovery. Otherwise stated, if the lessee
obtains a vested property right by virtue of the execution and de-
livery of his lease, two consequences logically follow. In the first
place the situation of the lessee is such that he may protect his
vested property right by an action in ejectment in a proper case,
and if ejectment will not lie, by an appropriate action in equity.
Secondly, the latitude for the rather promiscuous application of those
principles which are destructive of the lessee's title before discov-
ery will be greatly and very properly circumscribed. Before enter-
ing upon a critical examination of the cases in general it becomes
necessary to set aside a line of decisions which have resulted in
more or less confusion on this question. We have already alluded
to several holdings which are to the effect that an oil and gas lease
which contains an "unless" drilling clause constitutes a mere option.
This error persists in several very recent cases. While the Supreme
'Shaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (1917); Aggers v. Slafer, 256 Fed. 648 (1g9);
Washburn v. Gillespie, 261 Fed. 41 (x92o).
'nAdvance Oil Co. v. Hunt 1x6 N. E. (Ind., 1917) 340.
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Court of Oklahoma in some of its early holdings refers to a lease
of this description as an option, the later cases hold that the lessee
takes a vested property interest. Notwithstanding this, we find the
Federal court for the same jurisdiction where a "grant, demise and
let" lease with an "unless" drilling clause was involved, holding that
the lease creates no rights in rem, but rights in personam only.12
Then again, although the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has held
,that a "grant, demise and let" lease vests the lessees with a cor-
poreal estate,"3 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in a case originating in Kentucky where the granting clause was of
the same type with an "unless" rental provision, holds that the lease
'was an executory contract, the drilling and rental clause constitu-
ting a condition precedent to the vesting of title.18 These cases and
other decisions of similar import are predicated upon this funda-
mental error. It is here assumed that an oil and gas lease takes its
character from the "drill or pay" clause, while both upon principle
and authority the rule is directly to the contrary. In some juisdic-
tions the granting clause determines the nature of the rights created
by an oil and gas lease, while other courts hold that the lease takes
its character from the underlying purpose and intention of the grant.
Under either line of authority there is no warrant for the conclusion
that the drilling clause in the "unless" form establishes the nature
of the grant. The sole function of this clause is to fix the time with-
in which the lessee must drill, or in lieu thereof pay the prescribed
rental, the lease terminating ipso facto upon the lessee's failure to
drill or pay. Otherwise stated, the lease takes its character as a
vested property right either by virtue of the technical form of the
granting clause or by virtue of the underlying purpose of the
instrument, the so-called optional drilling clause having the effect
of a condition subsequent for the breach of which an estate already
vested is afterwards divested. Recurring now to the main question
as to whether the lessee's interest before discovery is vested or in-
choate, the cases take this posture.
The courts of Ohio, Illinois, Louisiana and Oklahoma observe
no distinction in the form of the granting clause, and unite in the
holding that a present interest in the land for the purposes of the
lease is vested thereby. Pennsylvania, California and Kentucky hold
that a "grant, demise and let" lease vests the lessee with a corporeal
estate in the lands for the purposes of the lease. Both Pennsylvania
1"2Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., 259 Fed. 656 (igxg).
=Kennedy v. Hicks, 18o Ky. 562, 203 S. W. 318 (1918).
"' Hopkins v. Ziegler, 259 Fed. 43 (x9g).
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and California distinguish a lease of this type from the other forms,
holding that the other forms pass an incorporeal hereditament only.
But the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a later case, criticizes
this distinction, indicating that if the court had not been bound by
the principle of stare decisis that could would hold any form of
lease to vest a corporeal estate?25  The Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky has not been called upon to consider the exact character of the
interest which passe under the other two forms of leases. Under
the later cases in Texas it is held that a lease granting the oil and
gas passes a present title to the minerals in place, and therefore con-
stitutes an interest in the real estate. Kansas without distinguish-
ing between the several forms of leases consistently adheres to the
rule that a lease creates an incorporeal hereditament. Wherever it
is held that an oil and gas lease creates an incorporeal hereditament
the decision is controlled by Funk v. Haldenan,'1
3 1 already within the
condemnation of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as indicated
above. A close examination of Funk v. Haldeman discloses that the
court found difficulty in classifying an oil lease as one creating an
incorporeal interest, and did so upon the theory that the lessee pos-
sessed a right in the nature of a profit a prendre, therefore an in-
corporeal right. Other courts adopt this classification,2
7 but the
owner of a profit a prendre is vested with an interest or estate in the
lands.1 38  Considering these decisions in their entirety they support
the rule that upon the execution and delivery of an oil and gas lease
the lessee is immediately vested with either a corporeal or an in-
corporeal interest or estate in the premises for the purposes of the
lease.
Setting aside the several isolated decisions of those jurisdictions
which by reason of the limited extent of oil development therein are
rarely concerned with this branch of the law, the only cases which
stand in square opposition to the rule announced above are those of
West Virginia and Indiana. The prevailing rule in these states is
that until discovery the lessee possesses no interest or estate either
in the minerals or the lands, his title being wholly inchoate. But
even here the right to explore rises to such dignity that the court in
115Hicks v. American NAatural Ga.s Co., 2o7 Pa. 570, 57 AtL 55 (904).
a'OFunk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229 (1866).
'nPhillips v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., 76 Kan. 783, 92 Pac. 1119 (907); Rich v.
Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okla., xg8) 86.
133Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425 (839); Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Alien. 459;
Grubb v. Guilford, 4 Watts 223 (1835); fohnstown Iron Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 32
Pa. St. 241 (x858); Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Obio St. 614 (1873); Pierce v. Keator, 7o N.
Y. 419 (1877); Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 49 Fed. 549; Heller v. Daley, 28 Ind. App.
555, 63 N. E. 490 (1902).
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a proceeding in equity will protect the lessee against the invasion of
this right by the lessor or a subsequent lessee.3 " The holding that
the lessee's right to explore is inchoate finds its way into so many
decisions and is so frequently the ground for cancellation of leases
that this question merits close attention. The rule is founded on a
decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
4 0 Here the lessee
took a number of oil leases the term of which was twenty years. It
was provided that a well should be drilled on one of the farms and
if oil were found in paying quantities, on any one of the farms oper-
ations were to be begun on the farm next adjoining, operations to
be continued until all the farms were tested to success or abandon-
ment. The lessee drilled a dry hole, and did nothing further for
seven years. The lessor sought the cancellation of this lease on the
ground of abandonment. The court, in decreeing cancellation of the
lease for that reason, said: "A vested title cannot ordinarily be
lost by abandonment in a less time than that fixed by the statute of
limitations unless there is specific proof of an intention to abandon.
An oil lease stands on quite different ground. The title is inchoate
and for purposes of exploration only until oil is found. If it is not
found, no estate vests in the lessee, and his title, whatever it is,
ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned. If oil is found,
then the right to produce becomes a vested right and the lessee will
be protected in exercising it in accordance with the terms and con-
ditions of his contract." In considering this holding in a very
recent case it is said: "Substantially similar statements will be
found in other cases involving oil and gas leases. It may create the
impression that there is nothing vested until oil or gas is found;
Such, however, is not the case, and no such thought was intended
to be conveyed. What is inchoate until oil or gas is found is the
right to produce oil and gas and the right to the oil and gas itself
which remains inchoate until produced. The right to explore, there-
fore, is at no time inchoate. It is vested, and will be protected
from the time of the execution of the instrument."'1
41 In this case
it is further said: "That an estate in the surface of the land of
some character vests in the lessee immediately upon the execution
of the instrument I do not understand to be questioned anywhere.
Possibly there is some question as to the exact nature of the estate
which vests, but otherwise there is none. * * * It is sufficient for
'" McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (i9o9); Hefner T.
Light Co., 77 W. Va. 217, 87 S. E. 2o6 (xgx5).
140 Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 AtI. 732 (1893).
'
4 1
Lindley v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (r917).
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the purpose thereof that an estate in possession to explore for oil
and gas does vest immediately upon the execution of the instru-
ment, and that an estate in the future to produce oil and gas will
vest on its discovery, whatever limitations or qualifications either
may be subject to." The doctrine of the Fretts case finds constant
reiteration in the West Virginia decisions, and to a less extent in
the Indiana cases, but ordinarily the rule is confined to that class
of cases where the lessor claims that the lessee has abandoned the
lease before discovery, and cancellation is sought on that ground.
Inasmuch as a vested estate cannot be divested short of the period
prescribed by the statute of limitations., it was deemed necessary to
hold that the lessee's title before discovery is inchoate or execu-
tory. 42 This is the true limitation of the West Virginia and Indiana
cases on this question.
Finally, then, the great weight of authority supports the propo-
sition that the lessee takes a present vested property right for the
purposes of the lease immediately upon the execution and delivery
of the instrument, the authorities differing only in the technical
definition of the interest or estate so acquired. On principle, the
distinction observed by the courts of Pennsylvania, California and
Texas cannot be sustained. As already stated, the owner of the
fee has the same title to the oil and gas in place ivfiich characterizes
the ownership of solid minerals in like circumstances, but by his
lease, regardless of the form of the granting clause, he does not
intend to convey the oil and gas in place or any interest therein,
nor does he intend to vest the lessee with the dual right observed
by the court in Lindley v. Raydure. On the other hand, by a lease
of this description the lessee is vested with a present property right
in the leased premises, namely, to search for oil and gas under the
conditions of the lease, and to appropriate them as personal prop-
erty if found, yielding the lessor the stipulated royalty. This is a
right to take a profit from the lands of another, and within the
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